

25 November 2016,  
Florence

# **RAIL TRANSPORT SECURITY: THE PASSENGERS' VIEW**




- 35 member organisations
- 20 countries

## > WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN PASSENGERS' FEDERATION?



- founded 2002
- the European umbrella organisation of national and regional passengers' organisations
- financed by its member organisations
- representing passengers' views at the European level
- dealing with all modes of public transport such as local transport, railways, buses, aviation and maritime transport

> PUTTING THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE




THE EXPLOSION SEEN FROM CHARGE CROSS STATION—SKETCHED BY AN EYE-WITNESS

THE EXPLOSIONS ON THE UNDERGROUND RAILWAY

- 2016: 35 dead in Brussels Airport and Metro bombings; several smaller-scale incidents on German regional trains
- Previous terrorist attack in EU leading to passenger deaths more than a decade before – in 2005 in London
- In recent years, 1 person killed and 1 person seriously injured every day in level crossing accidents in EU
- Level crossing accidents account for  $\frac{1}{4}$  of all rail-related fatalities (1% of road deaths)

## > If the concern is fatalities....


Fatalities per billion passenger km. (EU-27) *Source: ERA, 10.2014*



- Around 55k passengers sampled in GB's twice-yearly National Rail Passenger Survey
- Questions on terrorism added in Autumn 2005 in wake of 7/7 London Underground and bus bombings (52 death and more than 700 injured)
- 'Public fear' about terrorism and personal security on railway dissipated quite quickly after 7/7

# 7.7: Did personal security concerns prevent train travel?


Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509






# Reason for worry about personal security – at station

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509



# Reason for worry about personal security – on train

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509



- Lack of visible staff and anti-social behaviour is overriding security concern
- Usage implies that passengers assume rail is safe; rapid recovery from 'incidents'
- Passengers expect to be safe but do not expect to be inconvenienced by additional, intrusive security measures

- As many people use DB in a week as use Amsterdam Schiphol in a year
- Few main stations have spare space sufficient for airport-style checks
- Most railways are 'open systems' – unstaffed stations, accessible tracks...
- Rail users value 'turn up and go'

# 1. Avoid security measures that may have the effect of actually increasing the overall security risk

- **Precipitate security responses may further the goal of terrorists:** e.g. scanners at the entrance or on platforms in railway stations or transport hubs may create long queues and important gatherings which are due to become easy targets
- **Transferring to less safe modes may not be a solution** – a car occupant in Europe is 15 times more likely to be killed than a public transport passenger, per billion passenger-km travelled

## 2. Call for a proportionate response to terrorism threat

- **Scalability: matching resources to varying threats.** 24/7 competence, deployed only when vital
- **Pooling intelligence** – more effective pan-EU security cooperation
- Enforcing a closed system may be impractical and undermines the **'turn up and go'** valued nature of public transport
- Keep in mind the **displacement risk**: shifting threats down the line by tightening up on iconic services (c.f. Madrid 2004)

## ➤ WHAT MIGHT BE DONE



- **Passengers' awareness:** users' potential as the eyes and ears of civil protection
- **Visible and approachable staff,** engaging with passengers
- Full use of **digital technologies** - CCTV, a-typical behaviour and facial recognition software...

- ❖ **Vigilant passengers** have a crucial role as the ‘**eyes and ears**’ of a secure system
- ❖ BUT – **someone must be there and listen to them**
- ❖ Passengers emphasize the importance of a **visible staff presence** on the railway and the concern it causes when it is not there
- ❖ Besides providing tickets and information, and protecting revenues, visible staff presence offers a **reassuring human presence, helping enhance passengers’ cooperation and perception of personal security**; it also acts as a deterrent to crime and disorder
- ❖ To do this, staff must be both visible and approachable. They need to **engage with passengers**



- ❖ A **balance** needs to be struck **between** undertaking **regular patrols**, which provide reassurance to passengers, **and being predictable**, which lessens their effectiveness as a deterrent.
- ❖ When deployed **contracted security staff should be able to deal with enquiries** from everyday passengers. An inability or unwillingness to deal with routine enquiries will do little to inspire confidence from passengers that when 'really' needed the same staff will be there to help

- ❖ The need to provide reassurance and clear evidence that the railway is a **managed environment** arises everywhere and **at all times**.
- ❖ **Providing surveillance** and a sense of security to passengers should be **part of the 'day job' for all station staff**, not left to specialist teams whose members are necessarily restricted in their number and deployment
- ❖ Besides the human factor, **CCTV is the other crucial means to improve the passengers' security and its perception**
- ❖ To be effective, the presence of **CCTV needs to be well publicized**, but not give passengers the impression that the environment is unsafe

- ❖ While CCTV is seen as a significant factor in helping reduce passenger concerns over security, passengers themselves only see it as **effective when accompanied by live monitoring**. Without it, CCTV is merely a source of evidence after the event; with it, passengers describe it as ‘staff a step away’.
- ❖ The lack of **integration between the CCTV systems** operated on the railway and those operated by local authorities is also a point of concern, as people suspected of criminal acts cannot be tracked when they leave the station

- ❖ Some of the **emerging technologies** that the rail industry might also consider looking at in the future include:
  - ✓ **Automatic tracking** of individuals using CCTV – often based on the use of **facial recognition** software
  - ✓ Use of **smart CCTV** and rapid movement cameras – could be used to **detect unusual behaviour** on a train and alert the guard/driver/control centre to unusual behaviour
  - ✓ **Live streaming** of CCTV images **from inside trains**, for example where an emergency alarm has been activated

- ❖ Christopher Irwing's EPF presentation at LANDSEC  
<http://www.epf.eu/wp/epf-presentation-landsec-meeting/>
- ❖ Security in public passenger transport – EPF position  
<http://www.epf.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Security-in-public-passenger-transport.pdf>
- ❖ Transport Focus – Passenger perceptions of personal security on the railways  
<http://www.transportfocus.org.uk/research-publications/publications/passenger-perceptions-personal-security-railway/>

➤ Thank you for your attention!

