


Land Security: The Passengers' view

› Putting things in perspective



THE EXPLOSION SEEN FROM DRAINING CROSE STATION—SKETCHED BY AN EYE-WITNESS


THE EXPLOSIONS ON THE UNDERGROUND RAILWAY

› Proportionality

- More than a decade since last terrorist attack in EU leading to passenger deaths or injuries – London 7/7, 2005
- In recent years, 1 person killed and 1 person seriously injured every day in level crossing accidents in EU
- Level crossing accidents account for one quarter of all rail-related fatalities (1% of road deaths)

› If the concern is fatalities....

Fatalities per billion passenger km. (EU-27) Source: ERA, 10.2014




› UK evidence on passengers' priorities

- Around 55k passengers sampled in GB's twice-yearly National Rail Passenger Survey
- Questions on terrorism added in Autumn 2005 in wake of 7/7 London Underground & bus bombings (52 deaths and more than 700 injured)
- 'Public fear' about terrorism and personal security on railway dissipated quite quickly after 7/7


7.7: Did personal security concerns prevent train travel?

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509




Reason for worry about personal security – at station - *terrorism*

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509




Reason for worry about personal security – at station

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509




Reason for worry about personal security – on train - *terrorism*

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509



Reason for worry about personal security – on train

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509



› Passengers' priorities

- Lack of visible staff and others' anti-social behaviour is over-riding security concern
- Usage implies that passengers assume rail is 'safe'; rapid recovery from 'incidents'
- *'I obviously expect to be safe but I don't expect to be inconvenienced'*

› Practicalities

- As many people use DB in a week as use Amsterdam Schiphol in a year
- Few main stations have spare space sufficient for airport-style checks
- Most railways are 'open systems' – unstaffed stations, accessible tracks....
- Rail users value 'turn up and go'

› What might be done, credibly?

- Passenger awareness: users' potential as the eyes and ears of civil protection
- Delivering on the Digital Single Market Strategy, the TAP-TSI and SERA, *e.g.*:
 - Nominative ticketing
 - Video links from train to Control Rooms
 - Atypical-behaviour recognition technology
 - Research on 'bomb-proofing' assets
- PNR extension to all flights, rail and sea (but see Korff report for Council of Europe)

› For the passengers - but usually out of their sight...

- Scalability: matching resources to varying threats. 24/7 competence, deployed only when vital.
- More effective pan-EU security cooperation: pooling intelligence to complete the jig-saw.
- Adapting the Safety Management System (risk-based, systematic and comprehensive) approach to security (sûreté) issues.

› Not forgetting...

- The Displacement Risk: by tightening up on iconic services, shifting threats down the line (*c.f.* Madrid 2004) or to cyberspace (e.g. ITS)
- Maelbeek/Maalbeek: Ségolène's Thalys gates - a 'red herring' or even counter-productive? Metro closures and road hazards.
- Mobility as a personal right to be nurtured and cherished and as a key to jobs, growth and investment.

➤ Thank you for your attention!



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