


Land Security: The Passengers' view

› Putting things in perspective



THE EXPLOSION SEEN FROM DRAMING CROSS STATION—SKETCHED BY AN EYE-WITNESS


THE EXPLOSIONS ON THE UNDERGROUND RAILWAY

› Proportionality

- 10+ years since last terrorist attack leading to passenger deaths or injuries in EU – London 7/7, 2005
- 1 person killed and 1 person seriously injured daily in EU level crossing accidents
- Level crossing accidents account for one quarter of all rail-related fatalities (1% of road deaths)

› If the concern is fatalities....

Fatalities per billion passenger km. (EU-27) Source: ERA, 10.2014




› What passengers tell us

- Representative sample of >50k British passengers polled for 2 x yearly National Rail Passenger Survey
- Questions on terrorism added after 7/7 London Transport bombings (52 deaths and more than 700 injured)
- ‘Public fear’ about terrorism and personal security on railway dissipated quite quickly after 7/7


7.7: Did personal security concerns prevent train travel?

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509




Reason for worry about personal security – at station - *terrorism*

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509




Reason for worry about personal security – at station

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509




Reason for worry about personal security – on train - *terrorism*

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509



Reason for worry about personal security – on train

Source: Transport Focus, Request 3064, security data, special run for LANDSEC 201509



› Passengers' concerns

- Lack of visible staff and others' anti-social behaviour dominates passengers' concern
- Usage implies that passengers assume rail is 'safe'; rapid recovery from 'incidents'
- *'I obviously expect to be safe but I don't expect to be inconvenienced'*

› Practicalities

- Most railways are 'open systems' – unstaffed stations, accessible tracks....
- Rail users value 'turn up and go'
- As many people use DB in a week as use Amsterdam Schiphol in a year
- Few main stations have spare space sufficient for airport-style checks
- Danger of creating new 'soft' targets
- Constraining emergency response capacity

› What might be done, credibly?

- Passenger awareness: users' potential as the eyes and ears of civil protection
- Delivering on the Digital Single Market Strategy, the TAP-TSI and SERA, *e.g.*:
 - Nominative ticketing, *but* is it practical and is 'predictive policing' legitimate (Korpff)?
 - Video links from train to Control Rooms
 - Atypical-behaviour recognition technology
 - Research on 'bomb-proofing' assets

› For the passengers - but usually out of their sight...

- 24/7 Scalability: matching resources to varying threats, deployed only when vital
- More effective pan-EU security cooperation: pooling intelligence to complete the jig-saw
- Adapting the Safety (sécurité) Management System approach (risk-based, systematic) to security (sûreté) issues

› Not forgetting...

- The Displacement Risk: by tightening up on iconic services, shifting threats down the line (*c.f.* Madrid 2004) or to cyberspace (e.g. ITS)
- Security gates and limits on station access – new hazards (soft targets/mode shift)
- Restraining mobility – impact on jobs, growth and investment

➤ Thank you for your attention!



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