CEE Railways 2009


Ensuring the CEE Railway sector stays on the right track Bucharest, 27th & 28th April 2009

Rail Security and Safety Projects – The EPF Perspective

Varujan Apelian

European Passengers' Federation www.epf.eu varujan.apelian@epf.eu







What is the European Passengers' Federation?

- → an European umbrella organisation of national and regional passengers' organisations
- → office in Gent (Belgium)
- → financed by its member organisations
- → voice of European passengers, lobbying the passengers' interests in face of European organisations
- → dealing with all modes of public transport such as local transport, railways, buses and maritime transport



Railway transport security



Problems:

Increase in extremism and religious motivation in terrorist attacks Absolutely a nihilistic in forms of action

The terrorists are using more complex and flawless systems of attacking The means against conventional terrorism are not applicable to the new one

Decisions:

Complex appraisal of European railway system alertness against terrorist attacks

Development of programs for analysis of the terrorist risk Strategic centers for managing the security risks in rail transport Plans for actions in crises

Safety measures working steadily in periods of busy traffic Development of programs for prevention and public information Railway nets for alerting potential dangers



Basic minimum requirements

- High-tech detectors and cameras
- Emergency preparedness plans and equipment
- Passenger train emergency simulations
- Training and drills of railway staff
- Civil agents for control
- Railway counter terroristic teams
- Co-operation from other countries
- UITP's COUNTERACT project



The elements of security alertness

- Explosion-resisting garbage containers.
- Installation of cameras 360 degrees.
- More warning and informational boards and brochures.
- Training of railway staff and passengers to improve evacuation readiness.
- Joint training in order to improve co-operation.
- Secret checks of security measures.
- Increased presence of security guards.
- PR communication strategies for danger threats.
- Preparation for false threats and deception.
- Other actions in specific circumstances.



Plans for defensive actions

Level 1 - "Normal everyday activities"

Level 2 - "Level of high danger"

Level 3 - "Level of possible danger of attack"

Level 4 - "Confirmed or unconfirmed danger for railway sector that can occur in 48 hours or a country attack that has involved a lot of victims"



Overview of benchmarking about safety and risk control in the railways



US PASSENGER TRAIN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT

A. General purpose

Application
Purpose and scope
Preemptive effect
Responsibility
Definitions
Penalties
Waivers

Information collection

B. Specific Requirements

Emergency preparedness plan
Passenger train emergency simulations
Debriefing and critique
Emergency exits

C. Operational Tests and Inspection

Operational (efficiency) tests Electronic records and recordkeeping

D. Review, Approval, and Retention of Emergency Preparedness Plans

Emergency preparedness plan; filing and approval Retention of emergency preparedness plan



Brochure information system



Location of the emergency equipment



Emergency procedures



Location of the brochures



Panel information system



Information panel about passenger security (with key points highlighted)







Information panel with useful advice about passenger security



Information stickers and Multilanguage instructions













Emergency release of the doors, emergency alarm and an intercom connection with the train personnel





Instructions for emergency release of train doors



Instructions about safely using the train doors



Alternative emergency exits



Emergency window and instructions on how to use the emergency hammer to break the glass complete with illustrations.



"... Luckily for us there are methods which can help us further our knowledge about the problems of railway safety and security.

Simulations and specific training which are not implemented in the Bulgarian railways system can help define the weaknesses of those responsible..." *



^{*} Varujan Apelian, Railway transport magazine issue 11/12 year 2007 **


^{**} three months before the first train fire in Bulgaria in 2008

Preparation for simulation of a train incident









Human behavior in crisis situations







Simulating difficulties during evacuation

Co-ordination







Media participation and public broadcasting

The technical supply of the operation





European experience with train fires

06/11/2002 Nancy (Paris-Vienna express) Midnight train fire in the sleeping compartments of carriage 261 of DB at 02.15

5/10/1999 Ladbroke Grove (Paddington)
Massive fire supervene on train collision











Co-ordinated strategies for safety and security measures

- To define the role of the State in preventing or decreasing of the safety and security risks.
- To reduce the magnitude and severity of casualties in railway operations by ensuring that railways involved in passenger train operations can effectively and efficiently manage passenger train emergencies.
- To prescribe safety and security standards for the preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness plans by railways, connected with the operation of passenger trains.



Put the passengers on the focus!

Thank you for your attention.

varujan.apelian@epf.eu

www.epf.eu

